Centralisation and disgregation and public opinion: the future of the Spanish state of autonomies by Hidalgo-Redondo, Oscar
www.ssoar.info
Centralisation and disgregation and public opinion:
the future of the Spanish state of autonomies
Hidalgo-Redondo, Oscar
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Hidalgo-Redondo, O. (2015). Centralisation and disgregation and public opinion: the future of the Spanish state of
autonomies. Federal Governance, 12(1), 4-25. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-440597
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Basic Digital Peer Publishing-Lizenz
zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den DiPP-Lizenzen
finden Sie hier:
http://www.dipp.nrw.de/lizenzen/dppl/service/dppl/
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a Basic Digital Peer
Publishing Licence. For more Information see:
http://www.dipp.nrw.de/lizenzen/dppl/service/dppl/
Hidalgo, O. 2015, “Centralisation, Disgregation and Public Opinion: the Future of the Spanish 
State of Autonomies” Federal Governance, vol. 12 no. 1, pp. 4-25. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Centralisation, Disgregation and Public 
Opinion: the Future of the Spanish State of 
Autonomies 
 
by Oscar Hidalgo-Redondo 
 
University of New York in Prague (UNYP) and University of Tampere 
  
Email: ohidalgo1@unyp.cz 
 
 
 
Abstract: The Spanish model of decentralisation has been described by academics as 
a successful example of solving territorial questions under difficult circumstances. The 
original assessment is confronted with a reality that shows that in the last decade 
political forces and public opinions have changed the evaluation that made of this 
process. This paper analyses the evolution of the decentralisation model in Spain and 
assesses the changes among the Spanish public with the presence of two recent 
opposite tendencies: a centrifugal one, in favour of increasing the level of autonomy 
moving towards confederative solutions; and a centripetal one, that defends the need 
of rationalising the state of autonomies increasing the capacity of the central 
government to legislate and coordinate the actions of the regions. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords:  Spain, Federalism, Autonomy, "Autonomous Communities", Regions, "Southern 
Europe", Catalonia, "Basque Country", Reform, Decentralization, Transition 
Federal Governance ISSN 1923-6158              www.federalgovernance.ca 
Forum of Federations  
325 Dalhousie Street, Suite 700 
Ottawa, Ontario K1N 7G2 Canada        Hidalgo 
 
 
 
About Federal Governance 
Federal Governance is an online graduate journal on theory and politics of federalism and multi-
level governance. Its mandate is to engage the global federalism community and reach out to 
outstanding graduate students interested in federalism and multi-level governance. By providing 
a platform for graduate students to have early success in their careers, Federal Governance 
seeks to promote and sustain interest in federalism and multi-level governance research among 
graduate students. Allied with the Forum of Federations and founding partner, Institute of 
Intergovernmental Relations at Queen’s University; Federal Governance aims to contribute to a 
global dialogue on federalism. 
 
 
Co Chairs, Advisory Committee: Rupak Chattopadhyay and Christian Leuprecht 
Publisher:    Forum of Federations  
(Rupak Chattopadhyay and Philip Gonzalez) 
Managing Editor:    Maria Bertel 
Associate Editors:   Angustias Hombrado, Eyene Okpanachi, Samir 
Sharma, Johanna Schnabel and Marc Woons 
 
 
Terms of Use 
Your use of this Federal Governance article indicates your acceptance of Federal Governance’s 
Terms and Conditions of Use, available at www.federalgovernance.ca/terms. Federal 
Governance's Terms and Conditions of Use provides that you may use Federal Governance 
content only for personal, academic and non-commercial use. Each copy of any part of this 
Federal Governance article must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen 
or printed page of such transmission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hidalgo, Centralisation, Disgregation and Public Opinion              4 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The transition to democracy in Spain tends to be considered by students of processes of 
democratisation as one of the most successful examples of socio-political change under 
very complicated circumstances. Academics and political practitioners from all around 
the world have analysed this process with attention: classic transitology made of Spain 
one of its paradigmatic cases (O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 1986; Share, 1986, 
Linz and Stepan, 1996; Fishman 1990; Pridham, 1994; Gunther, Sani and Shabad, 
1986). The institutional building, the political leadership, the overcoming the political 
fragmentation and division, the successful integration in the Western European 
structures has made of Spain one the most studied and influential cases of 
democratisation (Linz and Stepan, 1990: 87). This apparent success of the Spanish 
transition managed not only to create a new regime leaving behind the threats of 
involution but also to modernise Spain and consolidate it among the selected group of 
nations with a high level of human development. The achievements in these thirty five 
years of democratic experience (the longest period ever in Spanish history) could lead 
us to think that the level of satisfaction of Spanish citizens with the major institutions of 
the Spanish political system is rather high. However, this apparent acceptance of the 
decentralisation scheme established in the democratic constitution of 1978 has to be 
questioned in the light of the political debate about the centre-periphery relations 
opened since 2004 and the subsequent reform of the statutes of autonomy in some of 
the Spanish regions. 
 
The aim of this paper is to re-assess the consolidation of the Spanish regional model 
focusing our attention on the transformation of the positive evaluations that Spanish 
citizens made of the system of decentralisation. Conducting an analysis of series of 
public opinion studies in Spain, two opposite tendencies can be seen. Firstly, a 
centrifugal one, represented by peripheral nationalist tendencies that question the 
fairness of the distribution of competences and resources between central and 
peripheral authorities. Secondly, opposed to the centrifugal tendency, a centripetal one 
that questions the adequacy of the current model due to the amount of resources that it 
spends and its incapability to integrate the nationalist forces.  
 
In this study, I will examine how in the last decade the apparent satisfaction with the 
Spanish state of autonomies has withered away. The electoral results show an evolution 
in the voting patterns of Spaniards that has favoured the forces with a critical discourse 
towards the present model of decentralisation. The strength of both nationalist and 
centralist parties pushes in favour of a reformulation of the model established since 
1978. The product of that transformation is not clear due to the presence of radically 
opposed tendencies, however, it is clear that in the present conditions, as this paper 
shows, the maintenance of the constitutional territorial model is an option rejected by the 
majority of Spaniards. 
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1. The 1978 Spanish Constitution, federalism and the creation of the 
Autonomous Communities  
 
Spain has never been characterised by a generous model of decentralised governance. 
Since the creation of Spain with the unification of the kingdoms of Aragon and Castile in 
the XV Century, the different Spanish rulers have maintained the hegemony of the 
central powers over local autonomous institutions. Some regions maintained local 
charters, a heritage of the middle ages that allowed them to keep a special status in its 
relations with the central authorities. These “Fueros” have been progressively 
suppressed by different governments of Spain extending the general legislation to 
virtually all the Spanish territories (Herrero de Miñón, 1998; Larrazábal Basáñez, 2005). 
The only exceptions are the Basque Country and Navarre maintaining their specificities 
until today with the constitution of 1978 recognising a unique relation with the rest of the 
Spanish territories. 
 
In the process of drafting and approving the current Spanish constitution, the regional 
question was one of the central axes (if not the central one) around which Spanish 
politics were pivoting (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 103). The discussion about the final 
articulation of the relation regions-central authorities was one of the most difficult issues 
to negotatiate and agree.. This was done in a context of extreme political violence 
directly associated with the nationalities’ question that added a huge load of drama to 
the negotiation. The Basque terrorist organisation ETA assassinated more than 150 
persons in 1978 and 1979 in the middle of the process of the approval of the constitution 
and the Basque statute of autonomy. 1978 and 1979 are two of the three years with a 
higher number of ETA’s assassinations. The final agreement was a very complex hybrid 
model that did not respond to the original model defended by any political force but an 
agreement that included some of the main demands of the political forces. The creation 
of this form of consensus was favoured by the difficult environment: an anti-democratic 
reactions was a real possibility, the risk of a revolutionary process in which the moderate 
Francoist elites would lose their capacity to lead the country could not be discarded, and 
ETA’s activity was a constant reminder of the weakness and fragility of the new political 
structures. In this context, the main political forces were ready to renounce to some of 
the programmatic preferences in relation with the decentralisation model. Memories of 
failed political projects due to their inability to obtain the support of a sufficient number of 
Spaniards (Tomás Villarroya, 1982; Fraile Clivillés, 1975; De Esteban, 1975) forced 
politicians to negotiate a constitution that no political faction would love completely but 
few would feel excluded from. And particularly, the civil war was an emotional reference 
point for the contemporary Spanish transition to democracy. The war was a national 
drama present in the public mind of Spanish people; the creation of the new democratic 
institutions provided the opportunity to overcome that traumatic and divisive experience 
(Perez-Díaz, 1990: 24). Thus, it could be said that the members of the commission in 
charge of elaborating the draft of the constitution imposed on themselves the need of 
agreeing. The commission itself, as a result of the 1977 constitutional elections was 
made up by very different political forces including all the major parties (three 
representatives of the governmental Unión de Centro Democrático, and one more each 
for the socialist party, the rightist party Alianza Popular, the Catalan nationalist and the 
Communists). The only major political party not included was the Basque Nationalist 
Party. However, the Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV) was consulted for the 
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elaboration of the chapter VIII on the territorial organisation of the state and it was also 
understood that the Catalan nationalists could represent their Basque counterparts. In 
fact, this exclusion was the reason why the EAJ-PNV did not to support fully the 
constitution. However, it is significant that in the constitutional referendum, the official 
position was to abstain instead of voting against the constitutional proposal. 
 
Considering the balance of forces in 1978, the new democratic state could not be 
unitary. Only the harder sectors of the Francoist elite, represented in the parliament by 
Alianza Popular (AP) favoured the creation of a centralist state. However, their electoral 
strength made them the fourth political force with less than 9% of the votes. On the 
other hand, the notion of federalism was too radical in the Spanish context of 1978 to be 
considered openly as an option. Moderate nationalists in Catalonia and the Basque 
Country proposed a federative solution. The same could be applicable to the leftist 
forces in the 1977 parliament more inclined towards a strong decentralisation. However, 
the electoral results gave Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) 166 seats in the 
parliament, only 10 seats below the absolute majority. UCD, the party led by Adolfo 
Suárez, was to play the role of the central stone around which the consensus was built. 
This party negotiated with centralist and decentralist forces to elaborate a model 
acceptable for all, taking concessions from both sides. 
 
Thus, the new model needed to use elements from federalism but, at the same time, 
reserving some powers for the central authorities to convince conservative forces to give 
their support to the new project. It is proper to talk about a “federal flavour” (Clavero, 
1985: 92) without being formally a federation. A regional level of governance is 
established with certain independent empowerment, defying the traditional 
understanding of unitary state (Smith, 2004: 16). The regional authorities are not just 
recipients of administrative competences but they have also the capacity to legislate 
without the supervision or interference of the central government. 
 
Despite the Spanish constitutionalists avoiding explicitly the notion ‘federal’ to define the 
state of autonomies the four classic elements that should be present in every federal 
state (Riker, 1964: 11) can be found in the Spanish model: two levels of autonomous 
government (each of them with legislative and executive authority and capacity to raise 
revenue); a constitution that divides powers between the administrative levels 
establishing constitutional boundaries; a constitutional arbiter that would decide in case 
of conflict of competences; and linking institutions in which both powers, central 
authorities and peripheral will cooperate. Thus, this model could be included among 
those states that some authors call ‘the devolved or regional state, sometimes described 
as the “meso” level between centre and locality’ (Keating, 2003: 109). A model based on 
the existence of autonomies that are the regional units sharing competences with the 
state but in a position of certain dependence and subordination. Agranoff uses the term 
of post-modern federalism to describe a model characterised by the existence of a 
federal elements without a complete federal design (Agranoff, 1996). 
 
2. A system in Motion: The Evolution of the Spanish Territorial Model 
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The constitution established the normative framework in which central and regional 
authorities were to be developed. The first stage was the development of the 
autonomies and assumption of competences by the regional governments. The 
constitution created a list of matters over which the central government has exclusive 
competences. However, the constitution makes reference to the possibility of 
cooperation between national and regional government to carry out this functions 
(Bassols and Serrano, 1982: 38). Article 150 opens the possibility to transfer or delegate 
competencies to the self-governing communities. In addition to that, the constitution lists 
in its article 148 competencies that regions are to take but establishes that the list of 
powers can be made more extensive if the statutes of autonomy (the regional equivalent 
of the constitution) add other competencies to the list. As Ruipérez points out it is not the 
constitution but ‘the statutes of autonomy that, in each case individually will establish the 
particular jurisdiction of the central and autonomic jurisdictions for that territory’ 
(Ruipérez, 1988: 237). This constitutional provision opened the first major debate, the 
question of symmetry/asymmetry of the regions. This issue wascentral in the 
discussions of the constitutional commission. While the nationalist forces wanted the 
constitution to reflect the differences between the regions, centralist forces considered 
that the principle of equality should prevail. The need of integrating the nationalists into 
the bloc of consensus forced the primeminister Suárez to accept the principle of 
difference, leaving a door open to a future equalisation of regions. It is what Manuel 
Fraga, the leader of the rightist party Popular Alliance, considered ‘a double and serious 
mistake by Suárez: to believe first that the pressure of the nationalisms would be solved 
not confronting them but brewing “coffee for everyone”, and, then, retreat and to say that 
coffee for some and re-heated coffee for others.’ (Quirosa-Cheyrouze, 2006: 178). 
 
The constitutional provisions did not clarify the question of symmetry of the regional 
competencies and the limits for the regional powers.  The model designed in the 
constitution did not refer to the existence of two different types of autonomies but of the 
creation of two paths towards autonomy: a fast track and a slow one. The fast road 
towards autonomy was reserved to those regions that had approved in the past statutes 
of autonomy (that referred to Catalonia, the Basque lands and Galicia). The slow road 
would be open to the rest of the territories that had to follow article 143.2 of the Spanish 
constitution to constitute themselves as an autonomous community.  
 
A second aspect related with the application of the constitutional arrangements is that 
the constitution established as the only limit in the assumption of competences by the 
autonomous communities the thirty two competences of the article 149.1. Regions can 
assume those competencies that the legislators c in their statutes of autonomy as long 
as they do not invade the exclusive powers of the central administration. The flexibility 
that is offered, the need of enlarging the “consensus bloc”, and the great number of 
political and social actors with their own different agendas, made the constitution very 
imprecise and open to various interpretations. In a context like this, the role of the 
institution in charge of determining the constitutionality of other norms becomes central. 
The judicial umpire, the Spanish constitutional court, has been placed in the central 
space for, as Aja points, out three reasons. One, as explained, the constitution is not too 
precise in the division of powers that is established. Second, the constitutional court has 
preferred a casuistic approach rather than trying to create general principles applicable 
to analogous situations. Third, the incapacity of the different administrative levels or 
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political actors to find agreements that would make the work of the judicial umpire 
unnecessary (Aja, 1993: 234).  
 
The consequence of the implementation of these principles was the creation of a strong 
asymmetry among the regions. Despite all regions, according to the Spanish 
constitution, are equal and can aspire to the same levels of self-determination (only with 
fiscal exception of the tax regime of the Basque Country and Navarre), the reality is 
different. The variation in regional development of the different territories of Spain 
appeared from the very beginning. The speed in the creation of each the autonomies 
had effects on the strength of the autonomic governments. As Martín Oviedo states, the 
‘especial procedure is not especial due to the requirements exposed but -in reality- due 
to the consequences in terms of competences that can be assumed from the very first 
moment by each of the Autonomic Communities’ (Martín Oviedo, 1980: 160). While in 
the case of the “especial” autonomies the constitution authorises them to assume 
immediately the competences of the regular autonomous communities (art. 148.1) and 
those others referred in their statutes of autonomy; those that use the “ordinary” track 
will have to wait for a period of five years to expand their lists of competences. This 
model is going to promote the existence of dual autonomic model in Spain with high-
speed communities (the Basque Country, Catalonia, Andalusia, Galicia and to certain 
extent Navarra due to its special fiscal arrangement) and the ordinary ones. These four 
regions were constituted from 1979 to 1981 and this constitutes a centrifugal element 
promoting a feeling of distinctiveness among the citizens of those regions. On the other 
hand, the rest of the regions were created from 1981 to 1983 and this was followed by a 
failed centralising attempt with the law for the harmonisation of the autonomic process 
(known as LOAPA): an attempt to limit and order the decentralising process endowing 
the central government with the capacity to overrule the statutes of autonomy but the 
Spanish constitutional court considered that that attempt was violating the constitutional 
principles. A new law, the law of the autonomic process, was passed in October 1983, 
and it became the norm governing the process of transfer of competences from the 
central government to regional authorities. This law initiated a process of transfer of 
competences that was problematic and required often the intervention of the 
constitutional court to resolve disputes between the central government and the regions 
and, also, between different regional governments. Nevertheless, this period was 
characterised by the modernisation of Spain and the development of the state of 
autonomies is perceived as an element that contributed to the advance of Spain.  
 
The second stage of the development of the Spanish regional model was initiated in 
1992 with a second great autonomic pact in 1992. The two major political parties in 
Spain, the Socialist Party and the Popular Party, agreed on extending the competences 
of the ordinary autonomic communities including thirty two new competences in an 
attempt to reduce the differences between the self-government of these ones and the 
historical ones. Nationalist parties (and particularly the Basque ones), considered that 
the pact was a threat to the privileges guaranteed by the constitution. This is a 
decentralising turn, since the regional governments assume more competencies but, at 
the same time, the historical regions (especially the Basque and the Catalan) consider 
that this movement towards the equalisation of regions questions their unique identity. 
However, the need of the support of minority parties in order to obtain a governmental 
stability after the elections of 1993 (with the Socialist Party supported by Basque and 
Catalan nationalists) and 1996 (with the Popular Party receiving the support in the vote 
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of confidence of Basque and Catalan nationalists and Canary regionalists) opened 
processes of negotiation about competences transferred to the Basque and Catalan 
governments that kept them being the two regions (also with Navarre)  with a deeper 
level of self-government. After the victory of the Popular party in 2000 with an absolute 
majority (receiving again the support of Catalan nationalists and Canary regionalist in 
the vote of investiture despite it was not arithmetically necessary) the relations between 
the Spanish and nationalists both in the Basque Country and Catalonia deteriorated. In 
this context, the Basque nationalist government led by Juan José Ibarretxe launched the 
known as the “Ibarretxe plan”, a project to change the relation between Spain and the 
Basque region transforming it into a confederative scheme. Similarly, in Catalonia, the 
“Tinell pact” (the agreement of the Catalan nationalist parties and the Spanish socialists 
to govern the Catalan region and give a new impulse to the Catalan region) showed the 
isolation of the Popular Party and the existence of an entente between the nationalist 
and the leftist forces that favoured the creation a new statute of autonomy for Catalonia 
that would extend the regional powers and strengthen its position in front of the rest of 
Spain. Thus, this second phase finishes with clear signs that the autonomic model, 
despite being considered a positive element by all the relevant actors, began to receive 
stronger criticisms by those that considered that it did not develop as it should have and 
needed a serious reform. 
 
A new phase was initiated in 2004 with the victory of the Socialist Party in the elections. 
The government led by Rodríguez Zapatero showed a predisposition to reform the 
statute of autonomy of those regions that considered it necessary. Catalonia that 
pioneered a process that concluded with the adoption of a new statute of autonomy for 
Catalonia in 2006  as well as for the Valencian Community, Andalusia, Aragon and 
Balearic Islands. This has been a particular traumatic process in which the reforms have 
become part of the political dialectic between political parties in Spain and the contents 
of the new statutes and particularly the Catalan have been subject to a close scrutiny 
(including a decision of the Spanish constitutional court (31/2010) that considered that 
fourteen of its articles were unconstitutional and declared void). 
 
Linked to the issue of the symmetry-asymmetry and the presence of centralising and 
decentralising forces and dynamics is necessary to refer to a second aspect that has 
characterised the evolution of the Spanish autonomic development: the competition 
between regions. The implementation of the Spanish territorial model has been 
accompanied by a very strong rivalry between the different actors involved in it. The 
competition is not just a centre-periphery struggle but also a confrontation between the 
different regional powers that find, in some cases, rivals in the rest of the autonomies 
that have been constituted. Examples of this confrontation are the legal challenges in 
the Constitutional Court of the new statutes of autonomy of Catalonia (challenged by the 
government of the region of Murcia, La Rioja, Aragon, Valencia and the Balearic 
Islands); Andalusia (challenged by the regional government of Extremadura); Aragon 
(challenged by La Rioja) or Valencia (challenged by Aragon and Castilla-La Mancha). In 
addition to that, the constitutional court has resolved six times more conflicts of 
competences presented by one autonomous community against another autonomous 
community than cases in which the central government challenged a regional 
government (Tribunal Constitucional Español).  
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Moreover, the role of nationalist parties in Spanish politics has increased the tension 
between regions. The negotiations and bargaining that nationalist parties have 
conducted with the central governments that were willing to trade extra-competences for 
legislative support in Madrid, the differential status demanded for the autonomic 
communities that have nationalist aspirations, have produced a dynamic of confrontation 
that has not contributed to appease a decentralising process that was inherently 
complicated. As Keating indicates nationalist politicians have played a fundamental role 
in Spanish national politics searching for individual gains for their community even at the 
expense of other regions (Keating, 1999). There is another by-product of the process of 
political decentralisation and the regional political competition: the fact that even within 
the state-wide parties, tensions between the national direction in Madrid and the 
regional directions (especially in Catalonia and the Basque Country, but not only there) 
have appeared since the nation-wide policies are not necessarily attractive for the 
regional electorates. This is particularly evident in the case of regional elections and the 
Socialist Party where the regional discourse and the national programs present often 
strong incompatibilities and there is an electoral volatility that can be explained due to 
this confrontation (Riera 2013; León, 2014). In addition to this, richer and poorer regions 
also compete for the allocation of funds that would help to redistribute wealth in Spain. 
Taxation, investments, services provided, infrastructures became part of this competitive 
scenario with the paradox that it is precisely the most economically advanced and 
specialised regions the ones that present a lower attachment to the union of territories 
(Bollen, 1998: 614). 
 
The last feature that characterises the development of the state of autonomies in Spain 
is its uncertain point of destination. The Spanish territorial model appears as an open-
ended process in which some of the local entities do not establish a goal in terms of 
decentralisation but, on the contrary, the end-point of constitutional evolution is never 
defined except to indicate that it would involve a greater degree of autonomy. This is 
particularly evident in the case of those regions with strong nationalistic sentiments 
(Keating, 2000: 39). The absence of an agreed point of destination has not favoured the 
generation of trust between the parties since the central governments (and some of the 
regions without regionalist parties) see that bargaining with the most advanced 
autonomous communities can trigger future demands as the wish list of competences 
enlarges when the petitions from the past are satisfied. The availability of European 
resources and the alliances between regional forces made more complicated the 
position of the central government (Montero, 2001: 149-50). 
 
3. Assessing Public Opinion: The Rising Dissatisfaction towards the State 
of Autonomies 
 
Once we have described all these difficulties, it is necessary to state that after almost 
thirty years of democratic history in Spain, the acceptance of the Spanish autonomic 
system was considerable. Most of the Spanish citizens considered the implementation of 
the the Spanish model of decentralisation was something positive. The periodical 
barometers published by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) showed that 
in 2005 that three out of four Spanish considered that the development of the 
autonomies was something positive for Spain (see figure I) and there was not a single 
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region in which the majority of the citizens did not evaluated the process positively. That 
included Catalonia that was the third autonomous community with the highest rate of 
positive evaluations.  
 
The perception and assessment of the autonomic process has changed radically since 
2005. The opportunity opened by the central government for the reform was taken by 
those regions that had shown an interest in reforming their statutes of autonomy and 
transforming their competence ceilings: the region of Valencia (2006), Catalonia (2006), 
Balearic Islands (2007), Andalusia (2007), Aragon (2007), Castille-Leon (2007) and, 
later, Navarre (2010) and Extremadura (2011). The process of reform was particularly 
complicated in the case of Catalonia and the draft adopted by the Catalan parliament 
was negotiated with the Spanish executive but, later, the Spanish Constitutional Court 
considered in 2010 that forteen articles were void due to their inconstitutionality. In 
general, the processes of reform have increased distrust and competition between the 
different administrative levels and also between the regions that consider other regional 
executives as competitors. This is accentuated in a context of financial scarcity and 
economic crisis where regions compete to have access to resources in order to deliver 
services to their citizens and where the central government has to make decisions about 
its plan of investments. The Catalan goverment has been the one that has most clearly 
expressed its discontent issuing the report  ‘The Disloyalty of the State towards 
Catalonia’ in 2013. The report denounced the situation in relation to three main areas: 
the aspects related with the culture, education, language of Catalonia; the paralisation of 
the bilateral contacts between the Spanish and the Catalan authorities and 
administrators and particularly in relation with the transfer of the competences pending 
to be transferred; and, thirdly, the finances of Catalonia and the unpaid debts of the 
Spanish administration (Department of Presidency, 2013). The economic aspects are 
critical for understanding of the disatisfaction with the central government: more than 
half of the report makes reference to questions related with the financing of the services 
offered to the Catalan citizens. Nevertheless, even if the economic context has an 
impact on the perception of the idoneity of the Spanish autonomic model, there are 
tendencies questioning the quasi-federal structure of Spain that go beyond the 
economic contingencies and that are transforming the way in which Spanish citizens 
assess their system of decentralisation. 
 
In the almost forty years that have passed since the death of Franco and the beginning 
of the democratic transition, Spain has not been able to integrate the nationalist 
sentiments that some of its regions have traditionally presented. The development of a 
decentralised territorial model has not produced the effect of deactivating the arguments 
of the nationalist groups that considered that the general Franco’s centralised and 
repressive regime impeded their development as a political community. With the 
establishment of a democratic regime the vindications of these movements continued. 
Béjar refers to the development of three different discourses favouring the nationalistic 
grievances: a progressive discourse that understands the nationalistic claims as a 
product of the repression and the forced centralisation. For these, the vindications must 
be understood as a historical debt. Secondly, a moderate nationalist discourse where 
the nationalist claims are linked to a cultural identification with a peripheral nation with a 
pragmatic understanding of the relations between the two governments. Thirdly, a 
radical nationalist discourse with an ethnic rhetoric in which Spain is presented as a 
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failure where the only option left for the peripheral nationalisms is the secession (Béjar, 
2010: 427).  
 
We have used as a major indicator of the evolution of the nationalist tendencies the 
results of nationalist forces in elections. We have decided to use only the results of the 
regional elections. The reason for this choice is the fact that the elections for the 
Spanish parliament and Senate show a very strong strategic voting in those regions with 
strong nationalist movements (Pallarés and Keating, 2006; León, 2014; Alonso and 
Gómez, 2010; Lago and Lago, 2000; Oñate, 2002) and that could hide the real evolution 
of centrifugal tendencies.  
 
 If we analyse the results of the elections for the regional parliaments in Catalonia and in 
the Basque country we can find that the autonomic process has not reduced the amount 
of votes collected by the nationalist parties. As it can be seen in the figure 2, in the 
Basque Country, the initial hegemony of nationalist parties has been balanced by the 
electoral raise of the non-nationalist parties after the 1990 regional elections. However, 
after the elections in 2009 the electoral support for state-wide parties declined. 
 
A similar development can be noticed in the Catalan regional elections. The support for 
nationalist options after its initial growth stabilised and as figure 3 shows, since 1992 
decreases in order to rise in the last three elections. Both in the Basque Country and 
Catalonia, the autonomic development has not been accompanied by the 
disappearance of nationalist movements. On the contrary, in the last elections the 
nationalist movements are very strong.  
 
Although the evolution of the nationalist vote is already illustrative, it is worth to take a 
closer look at the composition of the nationalist vote and the distribution of votes 
between radical (independentist) and moderate (pragmatic autonomist) options. Again 
the results show (figures 4 and 5) that the development of the Spanish territorial model 
has not managed to neutralise the centrifugal tendencies that favour the recognition of 
the right of self-determination and a potential secession of the territories where 
peripheral nationalism is strong. In the case of the Basque Country, the radical 
nationalist option has always maintained a notable electoral support. Independentist in 
the Basque Country have always constituted a sizeable portion of the electorate (usually 
between 10-20 % of the voters). Despite the fact that in the Basque Country the 
independentist vote has been linked to the strategy and actions of the terrorist group 
ETA (Hidalgo, 2013), the sharp decline in 2001 of the independentist vote has 
recovered, challenging for the first time the hegemony to the moderate options in the 
2012 elections.1  
 
In the case of Catalonia, the division between the autonomist and radical voter also 
present interesting results. After the first autonomic elections where the party 
Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) obtained very good results, the independentist 
options have received a very limited popular support until 2003. From those elections 
the results have granted the independentist options close to 30% of the seats in the 
                                               
1 The 2009 elections are very special, since for the very first time the party representing politically ETA was 
not allowed to participate in elections due to the decision of the Spanish courts of justice. The voters 
majoritarily opted for void votes and if we add the void votes to the other radical options the 
percentage of support of radical option could estimated to be between 25 and 30%. 
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Catalan parliament with the only exception of the 2010 elections (but those results could 
be interpreted as a consequence of the internal division of ERC and a punishment for its 
participation in the government led by the Socialist Party of Catalonia). Again, the 
increase of the competences enjoyed by the regional government did not translate into a 
moderation of the electoral preferences of the Catalan electors.  
 
Another element to be taken into consideration is that even though we are aggregating 
historical data to provide the time series, the discourse of the political parties has varied 
and the radicalisation of the moderate nationalist parties is a fact. In the case of the 
Basque Country the “Ibarretxe plan” in 2003 moved the moderate Basque Nationalist 
Party (EAJ-PNV) towards positions close to the independentist nationalism. The same 
can be applied to the political position adopted by the traditionally moderate coalition 
Convengence and Union (CiU) after the decision of the Spanish constitutional court of 
2010 that considered unconstitutional fourteen of its articles. CiU has defended the right 
of self-determination of the people of Catalonia, a position that from the nationalist point 
of view cannot be considered a programmatic option that a moderate autonomist party 
can defend. 
 
In the other side of the political spectrum in terms of the territorial question, the 
supporters of maintaining a unified Spain have also seen a change in their preference 
for the autonomic model. Initially the most conservative party (Popular Alliance, the 
antecedent of the governing Popular Party) was reluctant to the establishment of a 
generous decentralised regime, later this party accepted the state of autonomies in 
Spain. The rest of the state-wide parties were favourable to the implementation of a 
decentralised model of governance regardless of their preference for a federal or 
autonomic structure. The Spanish public, on the other hand has traditionally tended to 
be supportive of the state of autonomies despite its problematic implementation. Studies 
of public opinion conducted by the CIS show the variations in the evolution of the 
perception of the Spanish citizens towards the autonomic regime. The Spanish public 
opinion has radicalised its position towards the territorial administrative division with a 
sharp decrease in the percentage of citizens that are satisfied with the current model. 
While in 1998 one half of the Spanish preferred the autonomic state in its current state, 
data from 2012 showed that for less than one third the current model was its choice 
(figure 6). On the contrary, the number of Spaniards that considered that the 
competences of the regions have to be reduced has tripled (figure 7). An explanation for 
this declining tendency, in addition to the reaction to the nationalist tensions can be 
found in the consequences of the economic crisis in Spain that have exposed a highly 
inefficient administrative model with duplication of competences that increase the cost of 
the public administration. 
 
Opposite to this, in the Basque Country the number of citizens that preferred a more 
decentralised state increased in the last decade, and particularly the number of citizens 
that would prefer the recognition of the right of self-determination for the people living in 
their autonomous community (figure 8). In the case of Catalonia this tendency is 
particularly acute and it could be an indication of the frustration that the failed reform of 
the statute of autonomy has produced. 
 
When analysed the perception that Spanish citizens have of the autonomic process and 
the creation of autonomic communities, then, again the results can be considered 
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alarming (figure 9). The tendency to consider the creation of the autonomic communities 
as a bad idea has increased in the last decade exponentially. While in 2005, it was 
widely considered positive (both in Spain and in Catalonia or the Basque autonomic 
community: 68%, 77% and 73% respectively) in 2012 only in the Basque country more 
than half of the population considered a positive thing. It can be concluded that the 
number of people satisfied with the autonomic regime is clearly decreasing both among 
the people that live in the communities with strong nationalist tendencies (that feel that 
the autonomic regime is not evolving satisfying the aspirations of self-government of 
those regions) and those that live in the rest of the regions (that consider that the 
autonomic model is not effective and does encourage an escalation of the demands for 
self-government of the regions with a strong nationalist presence). 
 
Despite the development of centralist tendencies in Spain, not all the regions have 
evolved in the same way. The studies of the CIS show a growing proportion of citizens 
favouring the strengthening of the central authorities’ powers over the regional 
governments in the last decade. However, not in all the regions the perceptions of the 
citizens have varied in the same way. It is possible to distinguish three patterns among 
the Spanish regions: first, those autonomic communities that since 2005 have 
developed a strong demand for decentralisation; second, those territories that continued 
being satisfied with the present system of division of competences centre-periphery; 
and, finally, those regions that have developed a negative sentiment towards the state of 
autonomies and defend a re-centralising process. As figure 10 shows there is a core of 
regions where the critical positions towards the effects of decentralisation have 
increased radically. Regions like Madrid, Murcia, Castille-Leon, Castille-La Mancha and 
the Community of Valencia show a clear majority of citizens in favour of returning to a 
unitary state or reducing the decentralisation of the system of autonomies. This 
contrasts with figures below 20% in 2005 in all the Spanish regions. On the opposite 
side are other critical regions were the demands of self-government that were not 
followed by an increase of competences are spurring not just the development of 
nationalist sentiments but an independentist agenda (figure 11). This is the case of 
Catalonia (where the number of defendants of the right of self-determination has 
doubled), the Basque Country (that maintains the presence of a strong sector of the 
population in favour of the right to separate since the beginning of the democratic 
period) and Navarre (despite the sharp increase, the percentage of citizens satisfied 
with the present model is majoritary: 52% against 40% that would prefer more autonomy 
or the right of self-determination). The case of the Balearic Islands is a particularly 
interesting one with a strong polarisation with both strong rises in the percentage of 
population in favour of centralisation and decentralisation. 
 
In between these two groups we have regions like Andalusia, Canary Islands, 
Extremadura, Navarre or Rioja that are showing milder centralising tendencies but still 
maintaining a relatively large percentage of citizens that are in favour of keeping  the 
autonomic model of decentralisation.  
 
However, when analysing the whole scenario and its evolution from 2005 until today 
(see table 1), the picture is worrying. The number of citizens satisfied with the Spanish 
territorial structure has decreased in almost all the territories according to the autonomic 
barometers of the CIS. The success that scholars tended to refer in their analyses of the 
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Spanish autonomic model must be reconsidered in the light of the changes in the 
perception of the Spanish citizens since 2004. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
To summarise, we have analysed the Spanish territorial model and described its main 
features. The quasi-federal Spanish state of autonomies, despite not being formally a 
federative model, presents in practice a federal distribution of powers in which both the 
autonomic and central authorities assume important powers. Nevertheless, this model is 
still a source of political confrontation due to the fact that the constitution and the 
doctrine of the Spanish Constitutional Court do not offer a finished model and, on the 
contrary, the constitution is reinterpreted by both politicians and judges as conflicts of 
competences arise. In addition to that, the model has not satisfied the aspirations for 
self-determination of some of the regions in Spain, particularly those with strong 
nationalist sentiments among their citizens.  
 
Opinion polls and electoral results show that the sentiment of frustration is increasing. 
That frustration is spurred by a centripetal tendency that considers that the territorial 
model is ineffective and expensive and that in a context of economic crisis it would be 
necessary to reorganise with a centralising intention. Opposite to it, a centrifugal 
tendency promotes a confederalising reform in which the regions would obtain the right 
to decide about their future including the right of self-determination. The number of 
citizens satisfied with the present state is declining and the model is in danger of 
collapsing. The optimistic and positive evaluation of the Spanish autonomic regime that 
many scholars made in the 1990s and early 2000s must be put into question. The latest 
development could be an indication that the autonomic regime cannot be presented as 
an alternative to the classic federal or unitary duality. On the other hand, it may be the 
context of economic crisis (and shrinking resources) what has caused the decrease of 
the positive perception of the autonomic state and once the economic situation will 
improve, the ratios of acceptance will also increase. One way or another, the present 
circumstances appear like a setting ending the initial phase of implementation of the 
autonomic model. After thirty five years of democratic rule, the system of 
decentralisation in Spain needs to be refounded. There are three potential basic 
scenarios that can develop. The first one is the one in which the centrifugal forces 
impose themselves over the centripetal. In this scenario, the autonomic state would 
move towards a weak federative state or even a confederative one. It can potentially 
conclude with the dissolution of Spain or, at least, the start of processes of self-
determination in those territories more critical of the control exercised by the central 
authorities. Basque Country and Catalonia would be the first territories that could be 
followed by other regions.  
 
The second of the scenarios would be the one in which the centripetal forces would 
overcame the centrifugal ones. With the use of state institutions and change of 
legislation the centralist parties could reduce the regionalist and nationalist parties’ 
capacity to influence public policies in Spain. This could have a backlash effect with an 
increase of centrifugal movements in those peripheral areas limited by the new territorial 
model. A situation like this could develop into a scenario like the one described first in a 
second stage if the centrifugal forces would be spurred by the new relations centre-
periphery. 
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The last of the scenarios is the one in which centrifugal and centripetal forces attempt to 
find a compromise that using the bases of the constitution of 1978 and the autonomic 
pacts would satisfy both. The centrifugal forces would obtain levels of self-governance 
and autonomy that fulfil their need of determining public policy in those regions. On the 
other hand, the centripetal forces would ascertain that all regions would be loyal to the 
state and that public policy would be rationalised. If this could be achieved within an 
autonomic model or a federal structure would need to be implemented is a different 
question that in the process of negotiation would have to be decided. 
 
Independently from the scenario that will finally be implemented, Spain is going to live in 
the following months a critical moment in its constitutional history. The success 
described by the academics that studied the Spanish territorial model has transformed in 
less than a decade in a source of political confrontation.  
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Table 1. Variation in the Percentage of Citizens Satisfied 
with the Spanish Autonomic Model per region, 2005-2012 
 
 Variation 
2005-2012 
 
Region Tendency 
 
Andalusia 
-19.7 Autonomist 
Aragon 
-15.0 Centralisation 
Asturias 
-24.2 Centralisation 
Balearic Islands 
-20.3 Autonomist 
Canary Islands 
-14.3 Autonomist 
Cantabria 
-38.9 Centralisation 
Castille-Leon 
-40.0 Centralisation 
Castille-La Mancha 
-38.2 Centralisation 
Catalonia 
-6.9 Decentralisation 
Valencian Community 
-32.5 Centralisation 
Extremadura 
-33.1 Autonomist 
Galicia 
-13.5 Autonomist 
Madrid 
-31.5 Centralisation 
Murcia 
-40.9 Centralisation 
Navarre 
-0.8 Autonomist 
Basque Country 16.7 Decentralisation 
Rioja 
-29.3 Autonomist 
Average Spain 
-20.7  
Source: CIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
